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INTRODUCTION
Christopher Wills nearly "committed the [proverbial] perfect
crime"'-twice. First, Wills burglarized a Virginia home, but the
homeowner, Zabiuflah Alam,2 caught Wills in the act. Wills escaped
that night, but police later arrested him and charged him with the
burglary.3 Before Wills's grand jury hearing, however, Alam, the star
witness in the case,4 mysteriously disappeared. As a result, the
prosecution had to dismiss the burglary charges against Wills.
Investigators later determined that Wills had committed a second
1. Brooke A. Masters, Missing Witness Case in Jeopardy; Prosecutors Appeal
Rejection of Charge, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2000, at B1 (quoting prosecutors from the
U.S. Attorney's Office, Alexandria, Virginia).
2. The district and circuit courts both spell the victim's name "Zabiuflah Alam,"
United States v. Wills, 234 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 953 (2001);
United States v. Wills, No. 99-396-A, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3674, at *1 (E.D. Va. Mar. 17,
2000). Several newspaper articles, however, spell the victim's name "Zebiullah Alam,"
See, e.g., Brooke A. Masters, Md. Man Convicted of Luring, Killing Witness, WASH. POST,
Oct. 2,2001, at B2; Siobhan Roth, Crossing the Line to Nail Suspects, LEGAL TIMES, June
25,2001, at 9.
3. Alam identified Wills at a preliminary hearing. The court then referred the case
to the state grand jury. After the preliminary hearing, Wills was released on bond. See
Wills, 234 F.3d at 175.
4. The homeowner, Zabiuflah Alam, was the only person who could connect Wills to
the burglary. Masters, supra note 2.
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crime, luring Alam away from Virginia under false pretenses, through
the false promise of a job interview in Washington, D.C.5 Alam was
never seen again. Prosecutors were stymied by Alam's
disappearance; they had no body, no DNA, and no fingerprints.
6
They lacked adequate evidence for a kidnapping or murder charge
against Wills under state law and had nothing with which to charge
him under federal law.7 Should a person who burglarizes, kidnaps,
and murders escape punishment because of inadequate state and
federal laws? Had the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit not split with the Fifth Circuit and adopted a different
5. Police traced Alam's disappearance to a help-wanted flier left for him at his
apartment complex two days after Wills's preliminary hearing. See Masters, supra note 2.
The flier advertised a job with full benefits and gave a cellular phone number as the
contact. See Wills, 234 F.3d at 175. The number was to a cellular phone acquired by
Christopher Wills on the same day Alam received the flier. Id. Subsequently, Alam called
the number and set up an interview in Washington, D.C. Id. In the interim, Wills made
several phone calls to his brother, a prisoner in a Virginia state prison. Id. at 176 n.2. In
these phone calls, which were recorded by prison officials as a routine matter, Wills stated,
"I'm trying to get this dude, man! If I don't my ass is grass," and "I'm hitting him with the
drew out move ... I already got the fliers out and everything so I'm just waiting, you
know, for them to get it and call." Brief for the United States of America at 5-6, United
States v. Wills, 234 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 2000) (No. 00-4257) [hereinafter Appellant's Brief].
The day after the "interview," Wills told his brother that business had been "takin' care
of." See Wills, 234 F.3d at 176. Zabiuflah Alam has not been seen since. His car was
found in Maryland a little over one month after his supposed "interview" and
disappearance. Appellant's Brief, supra, at 7.
6. See Masters, supra note 2.
7. Wills's conduct evaded local kidnapping and murder prosecution in both Virginia
and Washington, D.C. due to technical reasons relating to venue. See Appellant's Brief,
supra note 5, at 32 n.14. In addition, each jurisdiction alone lacked the evidence necessary
for a kidnapping charge, as Virginia only had the fliers and phone conversations as
evidence, and Washington, D.C. had virtually no evidence at all. Even if the two
jurisdictions shared this largely circumstantial evidence, they still lacked enough physical
evidence to prosecute Wills under their laws. See also E-mail from Vincent L. Gambale,
Assistant United States Attorney, United States Attorneys Office, to Author (June 4,
2002, 06:15:15 EST) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (stating that the
"federal kidnapping statute gave [prosecutors] the hook [they] needed to indict in the
[Eastern District of Virginia] where, under our theory of the crime, the federal kidnapping
commenced" and that "there was even some question that the [Eastern District of
Virginia] had jurisdiction."). At the conclusion of the case, the jury did find enough
evidence to convict Wills of kidnapping under the Federal Kidnapping Act. See Masters,
supra note 2. The adequacy of the evidence in the prosecution of Wills is not at issue in
this Comment. Instead, this Comment discusses whether the federal courts had the
jurisdiction to hear this case at all, under the language of the Federal Kidnapping Act.
Whether or not the jury found Wills guilty, the important point is that a federal jury had
the opportunity to hear the case and come to its own conclusion.
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interpretation of the Federal Kidnapping Act,8 Christopher Wills may
have done just that.'
The Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a), states, in
relevant part, that:
(a) Whoever unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, 10 decoys,1
kidnaps, abducts, or carries away and holds for ransom or
reward or otherwise any person, except in the case of a
minor by the parent thereof, when - (1) the person is
willfully transported in interstate or foreign commerce,
regardless of whether the person was alive when transported
across a State boundary if the person was alive when the
transportation began;... shall be punished by imprisonment
for any term of years or for life and, if the death of any
person results, shall be punished by death or life
imprisonment.
12
In United States v. Wills, the Fourth Circuit interpreted the Act to find
federal jurisdiction for kidnappings in which the victim is lured
unaccompanied across state lines under false pretenses. In these
situations, the victim is not in the physical presence of the kidnapper
or his accomplices until arriving in the second state. 13  The Fifth
Circuit, the only other federal appellate court to address this specific
issue, held that "the entirely voluntary act of a victim in crossing a
state line even though it is induced by deception" is not within the
8. See 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2000); Wills, 234 F.3d at 179 (interpreting the Act to
include situations where the victim travels unaccompanied across state lines).
9. Though Wills was only prosecuted under the Federal Kidnapping Act, the Act
encompasses kidnapping resulting in death. 18 U.S.C. § 1201. Where the kidnapping
results in the victim's death, the kidnapper may be punished either by death or life
imprisonment. Id. The jury hearing the Wills case deliberated between the death penalty
and life imprisonment and sentenced Wills to life in prison without the possibility of
parole. Defendant Who Killed Witness Gets Life, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2001, at B2.
Because the jury deliberated between these two sentences, clearly Wills was punished for
both the acts of kidnapping and murder, as there is no option for the death penalty where
the kidnapping did not result in the victim's death. See 18 U.S.C. § 1201.
10. The term "inveigles" is defined as "enticing, cajoling, or tempting the victim,
usually through some deceitful means such as false promises." United States v. Macklin
671 F.2d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). "Inveigles" also means to "obtain by
cajolery," WEBSTER'S II NEv RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 641 (ed. 1984), or
"to lure or entice through deceit or insincerity." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 829 (7th ed.
1999).
11. The term "decoys" means "to entice (a person) without force." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 419 (7th ed. 1999).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a).
13. See Wills, 234 F.3d at 179 (applying this rationale and finding that Wills's actions
to lure Alam to Washington, D.C. were enough to create federal jurisdiction in that case).
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scope of the Act. 4 The key difference between the Fourth and Fifth
Circuit interpretations is that the Fourth Circuit found that the
jurisdictional component of the Act is satisfied when the kidnapper
inveigles and decoys the victim to cross state lines prior to any
physical accompaniment, whereas the Fifth Circuit did not. This
Comment argues that the Fourth Circuit's interpretation is the better
one. Expanding the Federal Kidnapping Act to include the Fourth
Circuit's interpretation accords with the plain text reading of the
statute, conforms to Congress's intent and purpose behind the Act,
and furthers public policy.
This Comment examines the interpretation of the Federal
Kidnapping Act in United States v. Wills and its resulting expansion of
federal jurisdiction. It also assesses the wisdom of expanding federal
jurisdiction to include kidnapping cases where the kidnapper does not
physically accompany the victim across state lines. Part I analyzes the
split between the Fourth and Fifth Circuits in light of the Federal
Kidnapping Act's origin, evolution, text, and case law. The Fourth
Circuit's rationale, along with other reasons for the split, are
developed in Part II. Part III then discusses the potential problems
with the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the Federal Kidnapping
Act. This Comment argues that the text, purpose, and rationale for
the statute warrant the interpretation asserted in United States v.
Wills. Despite some of the potential problems with expanding federal
jurisdiction under the Act, the new interpretation should be upheld.
I. BEHIND THE SCENES OF THE FEDERAL KIDNAPPING ACT
A. The Origin of the Statute and Interpretations of its Text
The Federal Kidnapping Act, often called the Lindbergh Law, 15
was enacted in the wake of the kidnapping of the twenty-month-old
son of Charles Lindbergh, the famous aviator. 6 At the time of the
14. United States v. McInnis, 601 F.2d 1319, 1327 (5th Cir. 1979). Though prosecutors
in Mclnnis argued the Fourth Circuit's interpretation, the court found that jurisdiction
under the Federal Kidnapping Act precluded a charge of kidnapping where a victim
traveled unaccompanied across state lines, even when induced by deception. Id. at 1327.
See infra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
15. Amendments to the Federal Kidnaping Statute: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Crime of the House Comm. of the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 20 (1974) [hereinafter Hearings]
(memorandum of Richard E. Israel, American Law Division).
16. Lindbergh's son was kidnapped from his New Jersey nursery on March 1, 1932.
Over the next two months, the kidnappers sent the Lindberghs thirteen ransom notes.
The Lindberghs paid $50,000 to get their son back, to no avail. Their son's body was
found four and a half miles from the Lindbergh home. The coroner determined a blow to
2044 [Vol. 80
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kidnapping, the Federal Bureau of Investigation lacked jurisdiction to
intervene in state matters. Federal agencies could not offer their
services to the State of New Jersey, the state in which the kidnapping
occurred, until President Franklin Roosevelt authorized their
involvement.
18
Mere months after the Lindbergh kidnapping, Congress passed
the Federal Kidnapping Act." The Act made it illegal for one to
"knowingly transport [ ] in interstate or foreign commerce, any
person who has been unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed,
kidnaped, abducted, or carried away and held for ransom or
reward."2  Forty years later, Congress amended the Federal
the skull caused the death about two months earlier. Eventually, through the Federal
Bureau of Investigation's role as the coordinating agency, Bruno Richard Hauptmann was
indicted for the fraud and murder, tried, and sentenced to death. See Federal Bureau of
Investigation, The Lindbergh Kidnapping, at http://www.fbi.gov/fbinbrieflhistoric/
famcases/llndber/lindbernew.htm (last visited May 5, 2002) [hereinafter FBI Lindbergh
Case]. The Lindbergh case was the first to involve a federal agency in the crime of
kidnapping. For a thorough discussion of the Lindberghs, the kidnapping, and the ensuing
trial, see Horace L. Bomar, Jr., The Lindbergh Law, 1 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 435, 436
(1934); The Honorable Steven Limbaugh, The Case of New Jersey v. Bruno Richard
Hauptmann, 68 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 585 (1999). Many websites also discuss the Lindbergh
kidnapping in great detail. See, e.g., Russel Aiuto, Lindbergh, at http://www.crimelibrary.
com/lindbergh/lindmain.htm (last visited May 5, 2002) (describing the kidnapping in
various chapters following the initial web page); Lindy Truth Website, at
http://members.aol.comilindytruthl (last visited May 5, 2002) (offering a forum for the
Lindbergh kidnapping and ensuing trial); The Kidnapping Index: Charles Lindbergh.com,
at http://www.charleslindbergh.comlkidnaplindex.asp (last visited May 5, 2002) (providing
a list of links about the people and events related to the kidnapping).
17. See FBI Lindbergh Case, supra note 16; Crime of the Century: The Lindbergh
Kidnapping Hoax, at http://crime.about.com/library/weekly/aall0199a.htm (last visited
May 5,2002).
18. Using a presidential directive, President Franklin D. Roosevelt centralized all
work on the Lindbergh case in the Department of Justice. See FBI Lindbergh Case, supra
note 16.
19. At the time, the legislation was commonly referred to as the Lindbergh Act.
Throughout this Comment, the statute will be primarily referred to as the Federal
Kidnapping Act or Act. The Act was enacted on June 22, 1932. Hearings, supra note 15,
at 20 (memorandum of Richard E. Israel, American Law Division). Congress had the
power to enact this legislation under the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
Through this power, Congress may regulate persons or articles in interstate commerce.
U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Thus, the Federal Kidnapping Act is valid because it
regulates a kidnapped person transported in interstate commerce.
20. 18 U.S.C. § 408(a) (1932) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000)); see also
Hearings, supra note 15, at 20 (memorandum of Richard E. Israel, American Law
Division) (discussing the original enactment in 1932). Two years later, Congress amended
the statute to encompass kidnappings for any reason, not just ransom or reward, except in
cases of parental kidnappings. 18 U.S.C. § 408(a) (1934) (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1201 (2000)) (adding the words "or otherwise" after "for ransom or reward"). The
Federal Kidnapping Act specifically excludes kidnapping of a victim under eighteen by the
victim's parent (not including someone whose parental rights have been terminated by a
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Kidnapping Act so that today it applies to "(a) Whoever unlawfully
seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or carries away
and holds for ransom or reward or otherwise any person, except in
the case of a minor by parent thereof, when - (1) the person is
willfully transported in interstate or foreign commerce.""1
The Wills case addressed whether the act of a victim traveling
unaccompanied across state lines with subsequent physical abduction
constituted a violation of the Federal Kidnapping Act.22 To establish
a violation of the Act, the prosecution must establish "1) the victim
was seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, kidnapped, abducted, or
carried away; 2) the victim was held; and 3) federal jurisdiction."
21
The district court in Wills found that the facts of the case did not meet
the jurisdictional requirement of the Federal Kidnapping Act because
the kidnapper did not exert direct, physical control over Alam until
after he crossed state lines.2 4 The issue on appeal was whether the
prosecution established federal jurisdiction.25
The Federal Kidnapping Act does not address the Wills scenario,
in which the victim is lured outside his home state and then physically
kidnapped in the second state. Courts may interpret this omission in
two different ways: 1) the Act does not cover this scenario at all; or
2) accompaniment is not a requirement of the statute. Although
numerous cases have interpreted the Federal Kidnapping Act to
encompass only situations in which the kidnapper has some physical
court order), grandparent, brother, sister, aunt, uncle, or a person with legal custody of the
victim. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(g)-(h) (2000) (citing a special rule for offenses involving
children). The instances excepted by the Federal Kidnapping Act are covered by the
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1999).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 1201. The Wills case first arose in a Virginia district court under this
statutory language.
22. Wills is distinguishable from Mclnnis because in Wills the interstate travel and
later exertion of physical control over the victim actually took place, whereas in Mclnnis
neither occurred; the court dealt only with the conspiracy to kidnap. United States v.
McInnis, 601 F.2d 1319, 1321 (5th Cir. 1979).
23. United States v. Wills, 234 F.3d 174, 177 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 953
(2001). After the 1972 amendment, federal jurisdiction is no longer an element of the
crime of kidnapping per se, but it is a necessary requirement to invoke the federal
kidnapping statute.
24. See United States v. Wills, No. 99-396-A, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3674, at *3-4
(E.D. Va. Mar. 17, 2000). The court found that including luring victims to travel
unaccompanied across state lines in the Federal Kidnapping Act "would be an
unprecedented expansion of the [Act], as well as unsupported by the language of the
statute." Id. at *4. The court cited a holding in United States v. Hughes, 716 F.2d 234 (4th
Cir. 1983), that federal jurisdiction exists after a kidnapped person is transported across
state lines. Wills, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3674, at *6 (citing Hughes, 716 F.2d at 238 in its
discussion of the elements of kidnapping under the Federal Kidnapping Act).
25. See Wills, 234 F.3d at 176.
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control over the victim prior to crossing state lines, Wills adopted the
second interpretation.26 Recognizing the conflict it created with the
Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v. Mclnnis,27 the Fourth
Circuit found in Wills that the kidnapper "willfully caus[ing]
unaccompanied travel over state lines is sufficient to confer
jurisdiction."'  Though courts have discussed the interpretation and
application of the Federal Kidnapping Act many times before Wills,2 9
the Fifth Circuit in McInnis was the only court to specifically address
the issue of whether the Act encompasses the victim's
unaccompanied travel across state lines.3 0
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in McInnis examined prior
case law and found significant that in cases holding that the
jurisdictional requirement of the Act had been met, "interstate travel
... occurred after some significant and unlawful step had been taken
toward the commission of the federal offense."'" The problem in
McInnis was that the physical seizure, that is, the unlawful activity,
occurred after the interstate transportation.3' In that case, two people
attempted to deceive the victim into voluntarily crossing from the
United States into Mexico, and then planned to have Mexican police
kidnap and murder the victim. According to the Fifth Circuit court,
merely inducing someone to travel across state lines under false
26. See, e.g., Eidson v. United States, 272 F.2d 684, 687 (10th Cir. 1959) (requiring the
victim to cross state lines in custody of the kidnapper). Cf. United States v. Boone, 959
F.2d 1550, 1555-56 (11th Cir. 1992) (discussing the outer limits of the statutory
interpretation of the Federal Kidnapping Act). In Boone, the court found that even
though the victim was willing to cross state lines due to the kidnapper's deception, the fact
that the kidnapper was in a position to use force prior to crossing state lines was enough to
constitute a kidnapping under the Act. Id. at 1556. The presence of the kidnapper is not
required, however, when co-conspirators are present. See, eg., United States v. Jackson,
978 F.2d 903, 910 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding that the kidnapper is liable even if the co-
conspirators transported the victim); United States v. Hoog, 504 F.2d 45, 50 (8th Cir. 1974)
(finding the kidnapping occurred where the aider and abettor transported the victim).
27. 601 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1979). The court details the kidnap/murder plot of the
victim Noe Villanueva by his ex-wife and the district attorney for Hidalgo County, Texas.
Neither the kidnapping nor the murder ever occurred, but the prosecutors charged the
defendants with conspiracy to kidnap under the Federal Kidnapping Act. Id. at 1321.
28. Wills, 234 F.3d at 179.
29. See the interpretive notes and decisions following the Federal Kidnapping Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1201 (2000) for a list and discussion of such cases.
30. See supra note 27 for discussion of the facts of the McInnis case.
31. McInnis, 601 F.2d at 1326 (citing Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954)
(receiving a fraudulent check); United States v. Levine, 457 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir. 1972)
(establishing an illegal business); United States v. Leggett, 269 F.2d 35 (7th Cir. 1959)
(stealing a car)).
32. Id.
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pretenses did not constitute an unlawful activity.33 Mclnnis, however,
did not rely specifically on the statutory text, but upon previous
courts' interpretations of the text.34
The Mclnnis court analyzed the text and history of the Act and
found that statutory silence on unaccompanied interstate travel
indicated its exclusion from the Act.' The court found that the
kidnapper's unlawful control over a person and subsequent interstate
travel forms the basis for federal jurisdiction under the Federal
Kidnapping Act. 6 Overall, the court could not justify extending the
Act to encompass a case where a victim voluntarily traveled
unaccompanied across state lines37 because the court required strict
construction of criminal statutes. 8 The court would not stretch the
statute to allow prosecution where the violation of state law would
otherwise go unpunished. But, as discussed below, 39 the text of the
statute does not support a finding that the interstate travel must occur
after the kidnapper exerts physical control over the victim.
B. The Fourth Circuit's New Interpretation
In departing from the rationale in United States v. McInnis, the
Fourth Circuit court in Wills relied upon the plain text of the statute,
or, rather, the absence of text in the statute.40 According to the court,
"[tlhe plain language of the Act does not require that the defendant
accompany, physically transport, or provide for the physical
transportation of the victim. '41 The Act only states that the person
must be "willfully transported in interstate or foreign commerce."'42
In support of this argument, the Fourth Circuit cited United States v.
Jackson,43 which noted that the Act "does not require that the
defendant move the victim or that the defendant know that the victim
33. See id. (stating that luring the victim into Mexico with a decoy was not intended
unlawful interference).
34. See cases cited infra note 64.
35. McInnis, 601 F.2d at 1324-27.
36. See id. at 1326.
37. Id. at 1327.
38. Id. (citing United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411 (1973); United States v.
Dudley, 581 F.2d 1193,1197 (5th Cir. 1978)).
39. See infra Part II.A.
40. United States v. Wills, 234 F.3d 174, 176 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 953
(2001).
41. Id. at 178.
42. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (2000).
43. 978 F.2d 903, 910-11 (5th Cir. 1992).
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will be moved in interstate commerce." 44 In addition, the kidnapping
statute does not expressly discuss accompaniment. Even though the
kidnapper often accompanies the victim across state lines, that fact
does not elevate the circumstance of accompaniment to an element of
the crime.45
The Fourth Circuit court noted that the statute includes
"kidnappings accomplished through physical, forcible means and also
by nonphysical, nonforcible means. '46 The Act specifically names the
two nonphysical means: inveiglement and decoy.47  The Fourth
Circuit court responded to the claim in Mclnnis that inveiglement and
decoy require physical accompaniment; it recognized that while most
kidnappers accompany their victims in interstate travel,48 the cases
using inveiglement and decoy as a basis for the crime did not make
accompaniment a mandatory requirement for the kidnapping under
the Act.49
The Fourth Circuit also held that Wills's actions met the
elements of the statute because Wills "willfully transported" Alam by
luring him across state lines through the false promise of a job
interview in Washington, D.C." According to the court, Wills
willfully caused interstate travel, and the fact that the victim was
unaccompanied did not render Wills's actions insufficient to confer
jurisdiction.'
Wills differs from Mclnnis not only in its outcome, but also
because of several factual distinctions. 2 One distinction is that the
44. Wills, 234 F.3d at 175 n.1 (quoting Jackson, 978 F.2d at 910-11). This statement,
however, was made in reference to the scenario in Jackson where the kidnapper did not
actually transport the victim but the co-conspirators took the victim across state lines.
45. In interpreting criminal statutes, "[w]e should not read such laws so as to put in
what is not readily found there." United States v. Hood, 343 U.S. 148, 150 (1952).
46. Wills, 234 F.2d at 177.
47. Id. at 177-78 (citing United States v. Macklin, 671 F.2d 60, 65-66 (2d Cir. 1982)).
48. Id. at 178.
49. See id. at 177 (citing United States v. Stands, 105 F.3d 1565, 1576 (8th Cir. 1997)
(finding sufficient evidence to hold the kidnapper liable because of his inveigling or
decoy); Jackson, 978 F.2d at 910-11 (finding federal jurisdiction even where the co-
conspirator took the victim across state lines not in the presence of the kidnapper); United
States v. Hughes, 716 F.2d 234, 238-39 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding a kidnapping occurred
where a man tricked a thirteen-year-old girl into accompanying him across state lines and
subsequently assaulted her); Macklin, 671 F.2d at 65-66 (luring the victim is enough to
establish inveiglement or decoy); United States v. Hoog, 504 F.2d 34, 51 (8th Cir. 1974)
(holding that inducing accompaniment through false pretenses is inveiglement or decoy)).
50. Wills, 234 F.3d at 178-79; see supra note 5.
51. Wills, 234 F.3d at 179. The court relied on the language of the Act to conclude
that the fact that Alam could have seen through Wills's kidnapping plan or simply could
have decided not to pursue the job opportunity is irrelevant in establishing jurisdiction.
52. See Appellant's Brief, supra note 5, at 30 n.12.
2002] 2049
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victim in Mclnnis traveled unaccompanied across state lines, but the
kidnapper never met him or exerted any physical control over him;53
whereas in Wills, the victim was met by the kidnapper, held, and
murdered after the victim crossed state lines. Another distinction is
that the court did not find a motive in the McInnis case. 4 Wills, on
the other hand, had a clear motive-to escape a burglary charge. Yet
another distinction is that the defendants in Mclnnis were charged
with conspiracy to kidnap,55 while Wills was charged with kidnapping
resulting in the victim's death. 6 Perhaps in part because of these
factual distinctions, but certainly for the reasons discussed below, the
Fourth Circuit in United States v. Wills split from the Fifth Circuit and
found jurisdiction under the Federal Kidnapping Act where the
victim voluntarily crossed state lines prior to the physical act of
kidnapping.
II. UNDERSTANDING WHY THE FOURTH CIRCUIT FOUND FEDERAL
JURISDICTION IN UNITED STATES V. WILLS
There are several different reasons that explain why the Fourth
Circuit expanded the interpretation of the Federal Kidnapping Act to
include situations where the victim travels unaccompanied across
state lines and then is physically kidnapped in the second state. The
court relied primarily upon a plain text reading of the statute, and it
also relied upon the congressional intent and purpose of the Act in
1932 and in 1972.57 Aside from textual and historical support, policy
53. United States v. McInnis, 601 F.2d 1319, 1320 (5th Cir. 1979).
54. Id. at 1320 n.2.
55. Id. at 1321.
56. Wills, 234 F.3d at 175.
57. Another principle of statutory interpretation, aside from the plain text reading
and examination of legislative history, is the "rule of lenity." The rule of lenity mandates
that courts construe vague or ambiguous criminal statutes in favor of the defendant. See
Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 57, 58 (1998)
(quoting NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCrION § 59.03 (5th
ed. 1992)). However, today the courts, particularly the Rehnquist Court, take a narrow
approach to the rule of lenity and typically use it only where "reasonable doubt persists
about a statute's intended scope even after resort to the 'language and structure, legislative
history, and motivating policies of the statute.' " Id. at 111 (quoting the majority opinion
in United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 297 (1992)). Neither the Fourth Circuit in Wills
nor the Fifth Circuit in Mclnnis discuss the rule of lenity in their interpretations of the
Federal Kidnapping Act. Other law review articles have discussed the rule of lenity at
length and this Comment does not intend to do so. It is sufficient to say that this
Comment argues that no reasonable doubt remains after an examination of the plain text
and legislative history of the Federal Kidnapping Act, see infra Part II.A-B, therefore, it is




reasons also support the Wills court's interpretation: one role of the
federal government is to protect the public, and it is essential to
prevent kidnappers from escaping prosecution under similar
circumstances in the future.
A. A Plain Text Reading of the Statute
A plain text reading of the Federal Kidnapping Act supports the
statutory interpretation advanced in Wills. In particular, it is the
absence of text that supports a finding of federal jurisdiction where
the victim travels unaccompanied across state lines prior to the
physical holding. Three issues arising from a plain text reading of the
Act resolve in favor of the Wills decision. The first is whether the two
nonphysical methods of kidnapping described by the Act require a
physical component. The second issue is how to interpret the
statutory phrase "is willfully transported." The third is discerning the
meaning of the change in the statutory language from the original
enactment to the language after the 1972 amendment.
A plain text reading of the Federal Kidnapping Act does not
require a physical method of kidnapping. The statute includes seven
methods of kidnapping.58 Two of these methods, "inveigles" and
"decoys," are non-physical methods.5 9 The Act does not expressly
mandate physical accompaniment; the text does not require any
combination of physical and nonphysical means, and the nonphysical
means have no additional physical requirements. Instead, it groups
together all seven methods of kidnapping, without any distinction
among them.60 The nonphysical terms, "inveigles" and "decoys,"
appear within the middle of the other physical kidnapping methods,6 '
suggesting that they should be treated the same as the other five
physical methods of kidnapping. Of the seven methods of kidnapping
set forth in the Federal Kidnapping Act, the text advances no reason
as to why the two nonphysical methods should need an additional
physical element, while the other five physical methods are
acceptable on their own.62 The Supreme Court expressly stated that
58. The term "kidnapping" is defined as "[s]eizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps,
abducts, or carries away." 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2000).
59. Wills, 234 F.3d at 177. These methods of kidnapping are expressly prohibited
under the Federal Kidnapping Act. See United States v. Hughes, 716 F.2d 234, 238-39
(4th Cir. 1983). See supra notes 10 and 11 for definitions of these terms.
60. See 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a).
61. Id.
62. One possible reason is that because five of the seven methods are inherently
physical, a presumption arises that all of the methods require some sort of physical
element. The plain text of the Act, however, does not support this interpretation because,
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the "holding" requirement of the statute "implies an unlawful
physical or mental restraint" or confinement accomplished through
"force, fear, or deception."63 The Fourth Circuit, among others, has
explicitly prohibited kidnappings accomplished by decoy and
inveiglement.'
While some physical aspect of kidnapping often accompanies
inveigling and decoying, and though prior cases relying on the
inveiglement and decoy provisions to obtain jurisdiction under the
Act also relied on physical accompaniment,65 the statute does not
require a physical element for the inveigling and decoying methods of
kidnapping.66 The commonplace instance of accompaniment does not
make it an element of the crime of kidnapping.67 "Inveigles" and
"decoys" are both defined as luring or enticing a person through
some trick or fraud or temptation; all the definitions exclude the use
of physical means or force.68 These definitions illustrate that the use
of force is unnecessary to establish a kidnapping charge, therefore,
physical, forceful accompaniment is not required to find a violation of
the Federal Kidnapping Act.
Unlike the interpretation of the kidnapping statute in Wills,
which takes advantage of the "inveigling" and "decoying" methods of
kidnapping, the Mclnnis court interprets these methods as requiring
again, the text does not expressly require a physical method of kidnapping.
63. Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455, 460 (1946) (emphasis added). The
kidnapping statute is designed to encompass "every possible variety of kidnapping." Id. at
463.
64. Hughes, 716 F.2d at 238-39 (finding a violation of the kidnapping statute where
the kidnapper enticed his victim to enter his vehicle through misrepresentations and then
exerted physical control over her after crossing state lines); see also United States v.
Stands, 105 F.3d 1565, 1576 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding the kidnapper liable for a kidnapping
accomplished through inveiglement and decoy); United States v. Macklin, 671 F.2d 60, 64
(2d Cir. 1982) (same).
65. See United States v. Boone, 959 F.2d 1550, 1556 (11th Cir. 1992) (finding a
kidnapping where the victim willingly crossed state lines through deception because the
kidnapper physically accompanied the victim and "remained in a position where he could
use force to ensure the kidnapping and transporting ... would take place"); Hughes, 716
F.2d at 239 (finding that the physical presence of the kidnapper turned inveigling into a
kidnapping through the kidnapper's exercise of control over the victim's actions); see also
Eidson v. United States, 272 F.2d 684, 687 (10th Cir. 1959) (finding sufficient facts for a
violation of the Act when the kidnapper crosses state lines with the victim).
66. See United States v. Wills, 234 F.3d 174, 177-78 (4th Cir. 2000), cerL denied, 533
U.S. 953 (2001).
67. See id.; see also supra note 45 and accompanying text.
68. Inveigling is "enticing, cajoling, or tempting the victim, usually through some
deceitful means such as false promises," Macklin, 671 F.2d at 66 (citations omitted), and
decoys is "entic[ing] (a person) without force," BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 419 (7th ed.
1999).
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forcible, physical control over the victim prior to the interstate
transportation.69 This construction of the statute implies that
inveigling and decoying also require a physical component, an
interpretation unwarranted by the statute and also prohibited by the
principles of statutory construction.70 The Fourth Circuit avoids the
problems of statutory interpretation created in Mclnnis through its
straightforward, plain text interpretation of the language of the
statute.
Several courts have upheld convictions under the Act employing
the inveiglement and decoy methods of kidnapping.7 United States v.
Hughes72 is illustrative. In Hughes, a man used false pretenses to lure
a young girl into his car and subsequently crossed state lines. Once
inside the second state, the kidnapper assaulted his victim. The
concurring judge in Hughes stated that "the statute requires not more
than that the intent to kidnap be formed, or be present, and the
kidnapping occur (if it has not already occurred) some time during
the journey that involves the crossing of a state line."'73 The facts of
Wills clearly fit into the scenario discussed in Hughes: Wills formed
the intent to kidnap prior to the kidnapping, and the kidnapping
occurred, through inveiglement and decoy, sometime before or while
the victim crossed from Virginia into Washington, D.C. Prior case
law supports the interpretation of the text that relies on nonphysical
methods of kidnapping, "inveiglement" and "decoy," to support
violations of the Federal Kidnapping Act. Therefore, those methods
should not be read out of the statute, as the Fifth Circuit court's
ruling would suggest.
Another textual issue concerns the phrase "is willfully
transported." The Federal Kidnapping Act establishes jurisdiction
69. See United States v. McInnis, 601 F.2d 1319, 1326 (5th Cir. 1979).
70. See, e.g., Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 62 (1998) (hesitating to adopt an
interpretation of a statute that makes another part of the statute superfluous); United
States v. Childress, 104 F.3d 47, 52 (4th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that courts must read
statutory provisions so that no part of the statute is superfluous); Virginia v. Browner, 80
F.3d 869, 876 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating that a court cannot interpret a statute to reduce a
part of the statute to mere surplusage).
71. See, e.g., United States v. Stands, 105 F.3d 1565, 1576 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding
evidence sufficient to prove that the kidnapper inveigled or decoyed the victim in violation
of the Act); United States v. Boone, 959 F.2d 1550, 1555 (11th Cir. 1992) ("The Federal
Kidnapping Act remains applicable to kidnappings accomplished solely by 'seduction of
victims,' i.e., by the inveigling or decoying of kidnapping victims."); United States v. Hoog,
504 F.2d 45,51 (8th Cir. 1974) (finding that victims are inveigled or decoyed under the Act
when the kidnapper induces them through false pretenses).
72. 716 F.2d 234 (4th Cir. 1983).
73. Id. at 242 (Widener, J., concurring).
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for the crime in five instances; the relevant instance here is when "the
person is willfully transported in interstate or foreign commerce."7 4
In Wills, the district court found that "is willfully transported" means
that someone else is doing the transporting, that is, the victim is not
transporting himself.75 But if Congress intended to exclude self-
transportation and require physical accompaniment across state lines,
it easily could have required that the victim be "willfully transported
by the kidnapper,"'76  instead of merely saying "is willfully
transported. 7 7 Willful transportation can be accomplished without
physical accompaniment. The Fourth Circuit found that Wills
"willfully transported" Alam by luring him across state lines by
leaving the flier, securing the cellular phone, and arranging the
Washington, D.C. interview.78 Wills's actions sufficiently conferred
jurisdiction under the Act, despite the fact that Wills did not
accompany his victim across state lines.79
The original language of the Act stated, "[w]hoever knowingly
transports in interstate or foreign commerce, any person who has
been unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed ... and held for
ransom or reward or otherwise."8  Today the language states,
"[w]hoever unlawfully seizes.., a person.., when - (1) the person is
willfully transported in interstate or foreign commerce."81 The
change is critical because the original language of "who has been"
means that there must be a method of kidnapping (such as seizure)
and a holding prior to the interstate transportation.' After the
amendments to the text in 1972, this "has been" requirement was
74. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (2000). The other four ways to gain jurisdiction are when
the kidnapping is "within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United
States," § 1201(a)(2), when it is within the United States' special aircraft jurisdiction,
§ 1201(a)(3), when the victim is internationally protected, a foreign official, or an official
guest, § 1201(a)(4), or when the person is kidnapped while performing special duties as an
officer or employee of the federal government, § 1201 (a)(5).
75. See United States v. Wills, No. 99-396-A, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3674, at *14
(E.D. Va. Mar. 17, 2000). The Wills district court argues that Congress could have used
the phrasing "whenever a person is inveigled or decoyed to travel across state lines" to
clarify that the statute intends to encompass situations where the victim travels across
state lines without the kidnapper's physical interference. Id.
76. United States v. Wills, 234 F.3d 174, 178 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 953
(2001).
77. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1).
78. Wills, 234 F.3d at 178-79; see supra note 5.
79. Wills, 234 F.3d at 179.
80. 18 U.S.C. § 408(a) (1932) (emphasis added).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
82. See United States v. Hughes, 716 F.2d 234, 242 (4th Cir. 1983) (Widener, J.,
concurring).
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eliminated, thus strongly supporting that kidnapping and holding are
no longer required prior to the interstate transportation. Instead,
federal jurisdiction exists anytime the victim is transported in
interstate commerce, at anytime during the commission of the crime
of kidnapping. 3 Contrary to the text of the Act after 1972, the
Mcnnis court found that the unlawful exercise of physical control
over the victim must be complete before the victim crosses state
lines.4 Again, this interpretation does not follow the plain text of the
Act. The term "when" in the current text of the Act is used "not in
its temporal sense-i.e., 'at the time that'-but rather in its
categorical sense-i.e., 'in cases where.' "85 The current language of
the Act supports the interpretation that the interstate transportation
may occur at anytime during the kidnapping, not only after the victim
is in the physical company of the kidnapper.
The foregoing textual analysis illustrates that a better reading of
the Federal Kidnapping Act does not find physical accompaniment to
be a requirement under the statute. The Act does not demand a
physical element in either the method of kidnapping or transportation
across state lines. Thus, as long as the victim is willfully transported,
physical accompaniment is not necessary to establish jurisdiction.
These plain text arguments help explain why the Fourth Circuit
expanded the federal courts' jurisdiction under the Federal
Kidnapping Act.
B. Congressional Intent and Purpose
The new interpretation adopted in Wills, finding federal
jurisdiction where the kidnapping victim is lured to travel
unaccompanied across state lines, adheres to both the pre- and post-
1972 Amendment purpose of the Federal Kidnapping Act. The
Fourth Circuit claimed that one can infer congressional intent from
the plain text of the statute, which does not require the kidnapper to
physically accompany the victim during interstate transportation.86
The court also mentioned that Congress did not intend to "[reward]
83. See id.; see also Appellant's Brief, supra note 5, at 29.
84. See United States v. McInnis, 601 F.2d 1319, 1326 (5th Cir. 1979).
85. United States v. Seals, 130 F.3d 451, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (reasoning that the
syntax and structure of the provision dictated this result and prevents words in the
provision from being superfluous).
86. United States v. Wills, 234 F.3d 174, 178 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 953
(2001).
2002] 2055
2056 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
the kidnapper simply because he is ingenious enough to conceal his
true motives from his victim."s
Congress's purpose in enacting the Federal Kidnapping Act in
1932 was to redress the growing crime of interstate kidnapping;s
accordingly, the Act focused not upon the kidnapping itself, but on
the interstate aspect of the kidnapping.89 The Senate Report stated
that:
The purpose of this proposed legislation is to assist the
States in stamping out the growing menace of kidnaping.
Kidnapers often seize a person in one State and transport
him into another State. The police officers of the first State
have no authority to follow into the second State but are
compelled to rely wholly on the efforts of the police officers
of the second State.
90
With this legislation, Congress sought to combat the crime of
kidnapping more effectively by enabling federal law enforcement to
pursue kidnappers across state borders, something the states could
not do.91
87. Id. (quoting Hughes, 716 F.2d at 239).
88. See Hearings, supra note 15, at 28 (memorandum of Richard E. Israel, American
Law Division).
89. Id. at 21 (memorandum of Richard E. Israel, American Law Division). Some
commentators contend that laws such as the Lindbergh Act were merely a reaction to
public outcry, not an attempt to enable states to prosecute these crimes. See Michael A.
Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecution Guidelines: A Case Study in Controlling
Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893, 904 (2000) (noting that the Federal Kidnapping
Act illustrates federalization based upon public outcry).
90. Hearings, supra note 15, at 21 (memorandum of Richard E. Israel, American Law
Division) (quoting the Senate Report).
91. See id. (memorandum of Richard E. Israel, American Law Division) (discussing
the comments of Rep. Sumners and Rep. Homer Hoch regarding the purpose of the
legislation in 75 Cong. Rec. 13292 (1932)); see also Model State Computer Crimes Code,
Why is it a STATE Computer Crimes Code (isn't federal law better?)?, University of
Dayton School of Law Cybercrimes Seminar, at
http://cybercrimes.net/99MSCCC/Ques5.html (last visited May 5, 2002) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review) (discussing how federal law has been used to address new
criminal problems). At this time, organized violence had created a kidnapping epidemic
in which kidnappers targeted the wealthy for ransom, as in the Lindbergh case. See, e.g.,
Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455, 462-63 (1946) (discussing the background of the
Federal Kidnapping Act). These kidnappers took advantage of a system in which no
coordination existed between federal and state law enforcement authorities; kidnappers
snatched a person in one state and then moved him to another and yet another state,
knowing that police in the original jurisdiction had no authority to act in the state where
the victim was confined and concealed. Id. at 463. See also Hugh A. Fisher & Matthew F.
McGuire, Kidnapping and the So-called Lindbergh Law, 12 N.Y.U. L. REv. 646, 653
(1934) (discussing the ease of interstate kidnapping due to lack of state coordination and
communication).
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The decision in Wills is faithful to Congress's original purpose for
enacting the federal law.92  Where states could not prosecute
kidnappers, Congress sought to provide a federal avenue of relief.93
The Wills case addressed exactly this situation; federal courts offered
successful prosecution of a kidnapper where states could not do so.
94
Allowing federal jurisdiction in such cases is consistent with the
original congressional intent and purpose behind the Act.
Forty years after creating the Act, Congress changed the focus of
the Act to the offense of kidnapping, instead of transportation in
interstate commerce. 9  The 1972 amendment to the Federal
Kidnapping Act made the interstate travel portion of the Act a basis
of federal jurisdiction instead of a component of the substantive
crime.96 The Senate Report concerning the 1972 amendment stated,
"in lieu of the sole jurisdictional base of transportation in interstate or
foreign commerce," federal jurisdiction exists when there is interstate
transportation, U.S. maritime and territorial jurisdiction, special
aircraft jurisdiction, or where the victim is a foreign official. 97 These
92. See generally supra Part R.B. (discussing the purpose behind the Federal
Kidnapping Act when it was originally enacted and then the purpose after the 1972
Amendment).
93. See Hearings, supra note 15, at 21 (memorandum of Richard E. Israel, American
Law Division) (citing the Senate Report at 1 and 2 and the debate between
Representative Sumners and Representative Homer Hoch in 75 Cong. Rec. 13292 (1932)).
94. "Now, two cases [Wills and Lentz, see infra notes 113-21 and accompanying text]
that were beyond the reach of local authorities are making their way toward trial thanks to
federal prosecutors' novel interpretation of a rarely invoked criminal statute-kidnapping
leading to death." Roth, supra note 2, at 9. Again, the Federal Kidnapping Act
encompasses both kidnappings resulting in death and those that do not result in death. 18
U.S.C. § 1201 (2000). See supra note 7 for reasons why states could not prosecute Wills,
i.e., lack of physical evidence.
95. See S. REP. No. 92-1105 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4316, 4317-18,
4322-23; Hearings, supra note 15, at 28 (memorandum of Richard E. Israel, American
Law Division).
96. See United States v. Hughes, 716 F.2d 234, 242 (4th Cir. 1983) (Widener, J.,
concurring) ("[W]e interpreted the 1972 amendments as separating the crime of
kidnapping from the federal jurisdictional bases of prosecution."). Prior to the 1972
amendment, the Act stated, "(a) Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign
commerce, any person who has been unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed,
kidnapped, abducted, or carried away and held for ransom or reward or otherwise... shall
be punished .... ." 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1970). The 1972 Amendment removed the words
"knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commerce, any person" from the substantive
portion of the Act, which describes the seven methods of kidnapping, and made
transportation in interstate or foreign commerce one of the several ways to establish
federal jurisdiction under the Act. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1972). See supra note 74 and infra
note 97 and accompanying text for the bases of federal jurisdiction after the 1972
amendment.
97. S. REP. No. 92-1105, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4316, 4326-27; see United
States v. Lewis, 662 F.2d 1087, 1089 (1981) (discussing the legislative history of the 1972
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textual changes illustrate congressional intent to focus on the crime of
kidnapping itself and to expand federal jurisdiction in kidnapping
cases beyond the limited instances envisioned when Congress initially
passed the Act.
The new interpretation also adheres to the purpose of the Act
after the 1972 Amendment: protecting against the kidnapping itself.
Where Congress intended kidnapping to be the thrust of the Act,9'
kidnappers should be prosecuted under the Act, whether the victim
traveled accompanied or unaccompanied across state lines.
Therefore, interpreting the Act to include unaccompanied interstate
travel comports with the intent that kidnappers should be prosecuted
in federal courts, as long as the jurisdictional basis of interstate travel
is present. Even unaccompanied travel is enough to supply that basis
of jurisdiction where the kidnapper has exercised sufficient control
over the victim, prior to interstate transport, to support a finding that
the kidnapper willfully transported the victim.
Despite the arguments that support the Fourth Circuit's
interpretation of congressional purpose, the Wills district court
interpreted Congress's intent differently. The district court stated
that Congress intended to end interstate kidnappings and that the law
"was not motivated by a desire to create a new catch-all federal
offense which subjects individuals to federal prosecution whenever
there is illegal behavior coupled with interstate travel."99 The Fourth
Circuit's interpretation, however, does not create a new "catch-all
federal offense." Instead, the interpretation coincides with the
specific purposes behind the Act in both 1932 and 1972. In 1932,
Congress wanted to provide an avenue of relief where states were
unable to prosecute kidnappings."° Under the Wills interpretation,
the Act does just that. Following the 1972 amendment, the primary
purpose was to protect against the crime of kidnapping,101 and again,
the Act offers this protection through the Fourth Circuit's
interpretation in Wills. Overall, the new interpretation of the Federal
Kidnapping Act complies with Congress's intent and purpose behind
the Act.
amendments and the relevant Senate Report).
98. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text. Congress changed the interstate
transportation element of the crime from a substantive element to a jurisdictional element.
99. United States v. Wills, No. 99-396-A, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3674, at *16 (E.D.
Va. Mar. 17,2000) (citing United States v. Toledo, 985 F.2d 1462, 1466 (10th Cir. 1993)).
100. See Hearings, supra note 15, at 21 (memorandum of Richard E. Israel, American
Law Division) (quoting the 1932 Senate Report, which stated that the purpose of the Act
is to help states stamp out the growing menace of kidnapping).
101. See S. REP. No. 92-1105, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4316,4322-23.
2058 [Vol. 80
2002] FEDERAL KIDNAPPING ACT 2059
C. Federal Role in Protecting the Public
The Fourth Circuit's interpretation is also supported by the
argument that federal courts have a role in protecting the public in
cases in which state law cannot protect citizens against crime."m By
passing the Federal Kidnapping Act, Congress intended to help states
in "stamping out the growing menace of kidnaping""1 3 and evidenced
its belief that the crime of kidnapping could be dealt with more
effectively by federal law enforcement." 4 Federal jurisdiction allows
federal law enforcement authorities to pursue kidnappers across state
borders, where state jurisdiction ends.05 Congress intended the Act
to have a broad scope for federal prosecution of kidnappings where
states could not do so, as long as the kidnapping fit into one of the
enumerated categories for federal jurisdiction.'0
6
The Fourth Circuit encompasses Maryland, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia. Of those five states,
only Maryland's and West Virginia's kidnapping statutes explicitly
cover kidnappings where the victim moves outside of the state.07 The
statutes of the other three Fourth Circuit states remain silent on the
subject of interstate transportation.08 Because three of the five states
in the Fourth Circuit's jurisdiction do not punish kidnappings that
originate in their state and then cross into another, the federal laws
and courts should offer protection.10 9 They can provide protection
102. For a discussion of the reasons why the Wills case could not be prosecuted in state
court, see supra note 7.
103. Hearings, supra note 15, at 21 (memorandum of Richard E. Israel, American Law
Division) (citing the Senate Report at 1 and 2).
104. See id. (memorandum of Richard E. Israel, American Law Division) (discussing
the point of the debate between Representative Sumners and Representative Homer
Hoch in 75 Cong. Rec. 13292 (1932)); see also Model State Computer Crimes Code, supra
note 91 (discussing how federal law has been used to address new criminal problems).
105. See Hearings, supra note 15, at 21 (memorandum of Richard E. Israel, American
Law Division).
106. Id. at 28 (memorandum of Richard E. Israel, American Law Division). This
intended broad scope is evidenced by the creation of new areas of federal jurisdiction in
the 1972 amendment.
107. The Maryland statute makes a felony "kidnapping and forcibly or fraudulently
carrying or causing to be carried out of or within this State any person." MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 337 (2001) (emphasis added). The West Virginia statute includes "transport[ing]
into or out of this state or within this state" in its felony definition of kidnapping. W. VA.
CODE § 61-2-14a(a) (2001) (emphasis added).
108. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-39 (2002) (specifying "remove from one place to another");
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-910 (Law. Co-op. 2000) (failing to mention kidnapping where the
victim moves outside South Carolina); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-47 (Michie 2001)
(mentioning "transports" but not transports out of the state).
109. The Maryland and West Virginia statutes suggest that those states would not
require federal protection because they already would have jurisdiction over cases such as
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through a broad interpretation of federal jurisdiction under the Act
and through vigorous prosecution.
Inadequate state jurisdiction may permit a kidnapper to escape
prosecution. Christopher Wills would have escaped punishment if the
Fourth Circuit had not split from the Fifth Circuit. Wills could not be
prosecuted under state law,110 so prosecutors had to turn to federal
courts or let Wills go free. Wills illustrates the benefit of federal
jurisdiction over cases of unaccompanied interstate travel. Surely
Congress did not intend to "[reward] the kidnapper simply because
he is ingenious enough to conceal his true motives from his victim." ''
If states cannot protect citizens from such crimes," 2 sound public
policy requires some other form of relief. The new interpretation of
the Federal Kidnapping Act in Wills supports the federal role in
protecting the public where states cannot do so.
D. Preventing Kidnappers from Escaping Prosecution Under Similar
Circumstances in the Future
Another policy reason supporting the Fourth Circuit's decision in
Wills is that the new interpretation will prevent kidnappers from
escaping prosecution under similar circumstances in the future. The
instance of a kidnapping victim traveling unaccompanied across state
lines has only arisen in the courts once before Wills."' A possibility
exists that prosecutors never pursued other cases of unaccompanied
interstate travel because they did not interpret the Federal
Kidnapping Act to include those cases."4 The new interpretation of
the Act offers greater opportunities for prosecution and less
opportunities for kidnappers to go free. Christopher Wills is not the
Wills. While these states may not need the help of federal jurisdiction, they may benefit
from the option. The remaining states do require federal protection in cases to which their
statutes do not reach. The focus of this Comment is whether federal courts have
jurisdiction in cases where the victim travels unaccompanied across state lines prior to
falling under the physical control of the kidnapper, not whether states also have
jurisdiction in these matters.
110. See supra note 7; see also Masters, supra note 2 (discussing the inadequacy of
physical evidence available to prosecute Wills); Roth, supra note 2, at 9.
111. United States v. Wills, 234 F.3d 174, 178 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 953
(2001) (quoting United States v. Hughes, 716 F.2d 234,239 (4th Cir. 1983)).
112. These states are certainly North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia.
Depending on the factual scenario, Maryland and West Virginia may be able to protect
themselves. See supra notes 107 and 109 and accompanying text.
113. United States v. McInnis, 601 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1979) (hearing a case in which
the victim traveled unaccompanied across state lines).




only person who could have escaped prosecution because of the lack
of evidence and inadequacy of state laws; another kidnapper, Jay
Lentz, also could have escaped trial under circumstances similar to
those in the Wills case."
5
Prosecutors could not address the disappearance of Doris Lentz
until the Fourth Circuit paved the way in United States v. Wills." 6 The
prime suspect in Doris Lentz's disappearance was her ex-husband,
Jay Lentz." 7 The couple went through a bitter divorce and custody
battle, and Doris Lentz filed several abuse and harassment complaints
against her ex-husband."8 Ms. Lentz, a Virginia resident, disappeared
in April 1996, and her blood-spattered car was discovered one week
later in Washington, D.C."9 Unable to turn to state law because of a
lack of evidence for a state charge and because of the interstate
aspect of the kidnapping, prosecutors looked to federal law.
Prosecutors could arrest and charge Jay Lentz with the interstate
kidnapping of Doris Lentz under the Federal Kidnapping Act only
after the Fourth Circuit decision in Wills opened up federal
jurisdiction to include kidnappers who lure victims across state lines
before exerting physical control over them.'
The Lentz case presents the precise scenario that the Wills court
wanted to protect against in its decision expanding the scope of
federal jurisdiction for kidnappings. The Lentz case is the first that is
based upon the interpretation of the Federal Kidnapping Act adopted
by the Fourth Circuit in Wills.'2 ' The Fourth Circuit's interpretation
of the Federal Kidnapping Act enables the prosecution of more cases
with circumstances similar to those in Wills and Lentz.
III. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH THE NEW INTERPRETATION
Although this Comment identifies many strong rationales for the
Fourth Circuit interpretation, the new approach may be subject to
criticism. Such criticisms include the traditional arguments against
federalization of state functions and arguments that the new
115. See Roth, supra note 2, at 9.
116. See id. (crediting the Fourth Circuit's new interpretation of the Federal




120. See Brooke A. Masters, Federal Death Penalty Sought in Va. Case: Husband
Charged in Disappearance, WASH. POST, Aug. 30,2001, at B5. Jay Lentz was arrested in
May 2001, and he is currently awaiting trial. Id.
121. The Lentz case is scheduled to go to trial in September 2002. Brooke A. Masters,
Alexandria, Courthouse Brace for Trying Times, WASH. POST, Mar. 13,2002, at B1.
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interpretation stretches the Act too far to permit federal prosecution
of purely intrastate kidnapping. 12z But these negative aspects are
minimal when compared to the benefits of the court's expansion of
federal jurisdiction and are insufficient to invalidate the court's
decision in Wills.
Federalization occurs when federal jurisdiction is expanded to
encompass criminal prosecutions that could be heard in state
courts."z Technically, one can view the decision in Wills as extending
federal court jurisdiction to a criminal prosecution that could be
maintained in state court.
24
One argument based in federalism is that federal law
enforcement resources are inadequate to enforce broad federal
criminal laws.'2 This inadequacy is illustrated by the sheer number of
federal law enforcement agencies dedicated to enforcing federal
criminal laws: there are over fifty agencies whose primary purpose is
to enforce federal criminal laws and over one hundred agencies
providing supplemental support, and all of them require funds to
operate. 6  In addition, the increasing number of federal criminal
statutes has correspondingly increased the federal criminal case
load. a7 Opponents also argue that criminal law federalization may
deplete the judiciary's resources."r The number of criminal cases
122. See Roth, supra note 2, at 9 (quoting Lentz's defense attorney as stating that "by
removing the requirement of accompaniment, the court is permitting purely intrastate
kidnapping to be prosecuted under the Federal Kidnapping Act").
123. See Thomas E. Baker, A View to the Future of Judicial Federalism: "Neither Out
Far Nor In Deep," 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 705, 742 (1995) (citing WILLIAM W.
SCHWARZER & RUSSELL R. WHEELER, ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF THE
ADMINISTRATION OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1 (Fed. Jud. Ctr. Ed., 1994)).
124. See supra note 7. This intrusion could happen in states whose statute encompasses
kidnappings where the victim is transported into or out of that state.
125. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief. The Federalization of American
Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1146 (1995) (discussing the "snowballing effect" of
enforcing federal criminal laws). In recent years, there has been sharp criticism against the
federalization of criminal law from judges, practitioners, scholars, and many others. See
Simons, supra note 89, at 895-97.
126. See Sara Sun Beale, Legislating Federal Crime and Its Consequences. Federalizing
Crime: Assessing the Impact on the Federal Courts, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
ScL 39, 44 (1996). Police officers, prosecutors, public defenders, court reporters, trial
judges, probation officers, appellate judges, prisons, and parole boards, to mention but a
few of the necessities of federal law enforcement, all require funding. See id.
127. See id. Between 1980 and 1992, the number of federal criminal prosecutions rose
by seventy-eight percent. Id.
128. Chief Justice Rehnquist has expressed his opposition to Congress's federalization
in the 1990s because of its effect of "taxing the Judiciary's resources and affecting its
budget needs" and the threat that it will "change entirely the nature of our federal
system." Simons, supra note 89, at 895 (quoting William H. Rehnquist, The 1998 Year-
End Report of the Federal Judiciary, Third Branch, Jan. 1999, at 2; William H. Rehnquist,
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assigned to each federal judge, however, has actually declined from
239 per judge in 1934 to 91 cases per judge in 1999.129 This minor
expansion of federal jurisdiction in the Federal Kidnapping Act is
unlikely to place an excessive burden on federal courts and federal
resources; most likely, the impact on workload will be negligible.1
30
A second argument is that federalization tips the balance of
power in favor of the federal government, thereby undercutting the
benefits of separation of powers.' 31 Federalizing crime lessens state
control over prosecuting kidnapping offenses. In addition, states
serve as "laboratories of experimentation" that help identify the most
effective state laws. 32 But the expansion of the Federal Kidnapping
Act does not limit local decisionmaking control or accountability.
The new interpretation only provides the opportunity for a federal
forum. The Act addresses instances of interstate transportation, an
area over which some states do not have jurisdiction.33 The new
interpretation still is rooted in interstate transportation and does not
cover intrastate kidnappings; that area remains under state control.
Most importantly, no true federalism concern exists where a
federal criminal law addresses conduct beyond the territorial reaches
of state laws."' Because states do not have jurisdiction beyond their
borders, a federal law against interstate kidnapping is necessary and
concerns an area in which prosecution cannot be maintained in state
court. Therefore, the expansion of such a law should not be subject
to concerns based in federalism.
Another potential criticism of the new interpretation of the
Federal Kidnapping Act is that it may be stretched to encompass
extreme scenarios that Congress originally did not intend the Act to
cover. In Chatwin v. United States 35 the Court concluded that "[a]
Remarks on the Federalization of Criminal Law, Address Before the American Law
Institute (May 11, 1998) in 11 FED. SENTENCING REP. 132 (1998)).
129. See id. at 910, 913. The low occurred in 1980 with fifty-seven cases per judge. Id.
at 913.
130. Consider that only one case (Lentz) has arisen in the aftermath of Wills.
131. See Model State Computer Crimes Code, supra note 91.
132. Id. For example, Maryland's kidnapping statute addresses instances where the
kidnapper moves the victim both within the state and beyond state lines. The statute
addresses situations where the kidnapper is "carrying or causing to be carried out of or
within this State any person." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 337 (2001).
133. Unlike the other Fourth Circuit states, Maryland and West Virginia have statutes
providing for prosecution in those instances. See supra notes 107 and 109.
134. See Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S.
CAL. L. REV. 643, 652-53 (1997). Again, this applies to those states whose statutes do not
cover interstate kidnapping.
135. 326 U.S. 455 (1946). In Chatwin, a sixty-eight year old man convinced a fifteen-
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loose construction of the statutory language conceivably could lead to
the punishment of anyone who induced another to leave his
surroundings ... state lines subsequently being traversed.' 13 6  The
Court then espoused the "absurdity of such a result" 137 because it may
result in unfair punishment to the inducer.'38 Punishment of the
inducer is precisely the result in the Wills case, as Christopher Wills
was punished for inducing Zabiuflah Alam to leave his home and
subsequently cross state lines. But as evidenced in the Wills case,
punishing a kidnapper for inducing a victim to leave his home and
cross state lines is not absurd. The kidnapper in Wills killed his
victim, whereas the Chatwin Court found the situation absurd
because the kidnapper in that case only married his underage
victim. 139 Where an inducement leads to kidnapping and murder, the
Act should punish the inducer.
40
Another criticism is that the new interpretation of the Act allows
it to encompass solely intrastate kidnappings.'4 ' If the victim crosses
state lines without the presence of the kidnapper, the entire
kidnapping essentially takes place in the second state. The kidnapper
exerts control over the victim and commits the physical component of
the crime of kidnapping in the second state. The court in Wills,
however, did not find federal jurisdiction based on this scenario.
Instead, it viewed the issue of control as broader than mere physical
coercion. It found that Wills exerted control over Alam in Virginia,
before Alam crossed state lines,42 by setting up the devices used to
year-old girl to run away to another state and enter into a "celestial marriage" with him.
Id. at 457-58.
136. Id. at 463.
137. Id. at 464.
138. Id. at 464-65. The Court refers to such inducement in the context in which the
person who is induced to leave his surroundings performs some illegal or innocent act that
would benefit the person who induced him to leave. The Court does not expand upon this
idea, but examples of unfair punishment to a person inducing another to leave his or her
surroundings may include inducing someone to come to another state for a date or a party.
The Court claims that such a loose construction not only will lead to unfair punishment,
but also to blackmail. Id. at 465. The Court fails to explain how blackmail could result
from a loose construction of the statutory language of the Act. A possible meaning is an
"immoral" situation such as when a married woman crosses state lines to have an affair
and her husband alleges interstate kidnapping against her lover, claiming the kidnapper
lured his wife. Any such attempt to use this understanding would be thwarted by the
"unlawfulness" requirement and the requirement that the victim did not consent.
139. See id. at 463-64; see also supra note 136.
140. Inadequate evidence existed to charge Wills with murder, so the court had to turn
to the Federal Kidnapping Act or let Wills go free. See supra note 7.
141. See supra note 122.




lure Alam into Washington, D.C., including placing the flier at
Alam's apartment, acquiring a cellular phone, and setting up the
interview.143 Wills's actions showed that he "willfully transported" his
victim, as defined under the Federal Kidnapping Act. 44 Accordingly,
federal courts would not have jurisdiction over intrastate kidnappings
if the kidnapper did not exert sufficient control over the victim in the
originating state. The kidnapper must willfully transport the victim to
confer federal jurisdiction over the crime.
Finally, the new interpretation also may be criticized for its
potentially over-broad effects on Internet meetings. People often
meet initially over Internet chat rooms; later many of them choose to
meet in person. 45  The concern is that convincing an Internet
acquaintance to leave his or her state for a meeting will be considered
a kidnapping under the Act. People frequently misrepresent
themselves or their circumstances-for example, their appearance or
intentions-in convincing the other person to meet. 46 The elements
of "willful transportation," "inveigles" or "decoys," and federal
jurisdiction may be present in such a scenario, but they are not
enough. For these actions to be considered a federal kidnapping, the
element of "holding" is also required. 47 When Christopher Wills
lured Alam across state lines, this "holding" was present, unlike in
instances of typical Internet meetings. Thus, the new interpretation
actually may be beneficial with respect to the Internet because it
allows federal prosecution of kidnappings facilitated through the
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. For example, cyber-dating is an increasing phenomenon and there are many
online dating websites. The frequency of Internet meetings leading to in-person meetings
is evidenced by the fact that in one year there have been seventy-five weddings of couples
who met through one online dating website. See Lee Hickling, Love at First Click? Cyber-
Dating Can Lead to Healthy Romantic Relationships, at http:llwww.drkoop.comlnews/
stories/2001/febll3_romance.html?ptp=true (Feb. 13, 2001) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review) (quoting romance coach, Leslie Karsner, for UDate.com).
146. An example of this phenomena appears in United States v. Romero, 189 F.3d 576,
578 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1011 (2000) (describing how a thirty-six-year-old
man posed as a fifteen-year-old and then as a twenty-year-old to lure a young boy into
running away with him).
147. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2001) (criminalizing the act of kidnapping "and hold[ing] for
ransom or reward or otherwise"); Wills, 234 F.3d at 177 (discussing the elements required
to prove a violation of the Federal Kidnapping Act and describing the "holding" element
as one that need not involve ransom or reward). The elements are "that: 1) the victim
was seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, kidnapped, abducted, or carried away; 2) the
victim was held; and 3) federal jurisdiction." Id. (footnote omitted). Possible "holdings"
that would qualify an Internet meeting as a kidnapping include luring victims across state
lines and subsequently holding them for sexual abuse, holding a minor against his will, or
even holding someone for ransom. Id.
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Internet if the elements of the crime are fulfilled, particularly if
someone is held against her will.
CONCLUSION
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit correctly interpreted the Federal Kidnapping Act in United
States v. Wills. The Wills case concerned a man who potentially could
have gone unpunished for burglary, kidnapping, and murder if the
court had not found federal jurisdiction. Not only is the new
interpretation appropriate based on the facts of the Wills case, it is
the correct interpretation for all future interstate kidnapping cases.
The new interpretation of the Act allows federal jurisdiction to
include kidnapping cases where the kidnapper does not physically
accompany the victim across state lines. This interpretation is
consistent with the plain text and the purpose of the Act. Policy
factors, such as the importance of the federal role in protecting the
public and preventing kidnappers from escaping prosecution under
similar circumstances in the future, also support this interpretation.
Now a forum exists for prosecution of interstate kidnapping, which
prevents kidnappers from escaping punishment.
The weight of the evidence illustrates that the new interpretation
does not actually expand federal jurisdiction at all. The new
interpretation is merely the best interpretation of the statute,
according to the text, purpose, and reasoning behind the Act.
Because of the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the Federal
Kidnapping Act, Christopher Wills was unable to commit the perfect
crime, and the federal courts brought him to justice.14s
BRITENAE M. COATES
148. Wills could have been sentenced to death for the kidnapping and killing of Alam
but was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. See Defendant Who
Killed Witness Gets Life, supra note 9.
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